Wealth Signal

Wealth Signal 💠

Edition 059 Wednesday 11 November 2026 Coverage window 3–11 Nov 2026

Anomaly Board

2 flags

Actions that break the person's own prior pattern. Measured against their own filings, not against a peer group.

Arne Alexander Wilhelmsen Txns 4–10 Nov 2026 · Royal Caribbean (RCL)

The family holding company Awilhelmsen AS sold 716,674 RCL shares across five sessions for roughly $242m, at prices from $319.20 to $342.27. Its reported balance went 12,400,651 → 11,673,977.

Why unusual: that balance was 12,400,651 on 27 February 2026. Over the eight months and five days between the two filings, the entity disposed of roughly 10,000 shares in total. Then it sold 716,674 in five sessions — about 72× the whole preceding eight months. Eight months of silence, then a week.

Keith A. Meister Txns 3–4 Nov · Form 144 filed 10 Nov 17:15 ET · Illumina (ILMN)

Sold 281,433 ILMN shares on 3–4 November in a range of $225.12–$241.42, about $66.56m, leaving 488,917 indirect and 6,887 direct. Six sessions later Corvex Management LP filed a Form 144 to sell 375,000 more at an indicated $220.78 — about $82.79m.

Why unusual: the escalation runs the wrong way. The notice is 24% larger in dollars than the sale he just completed, at a price 8.5% below the top of the executed range, and it covers roughly 76% of everything he has left. A sitting director raising size into his own drawdown is the shape of an exit, not a trim.

Nothing else in the window broke a person's own pattern on the numbers. Charles Schwab's sale-then-gift and Trygve Seglem's $43.5m "purchase" are both unusual in kind rather than in size, and sit in §1 instead. No anomaly has been manufactured to fill the board.
§ 1

The Log

One block per person-action. Three this edition. Two of the three turn on the same question: what instrument was actually bought or sold, as opposed to what the screener counted.

Confirmed · 2 filings + 2 outlets Form 4 · Form 144

Awilhelmsen AS sold $242m of Royal Caribbean in five sessions — at half February's daily pace

Arne Alexander Wilhelmsen · director, Royal Caribbean Group · third-generation principal of the Norwegian founding family
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What they did
DateSharesPrice / rangeValue
4–5 Nov 2026240,000$319.20 – $335.08~$82.1m
6 Nov 2026132,472wtd $326.39$43.24m
9 Nov 2026175,672wtd $338.46$59.46m
10 Nov 2026168,530wtd $338.98$57.13m
5 sessions716,674$319.20 – $342.27~$241.9m

All sales executed by AWILHELMSEN AS. The second reported line, AWILHELMSEN ASSET MANAGEMENT AS, has held exactly 4,035,259 shares throughout and did not move. Wilhelmsen holds 7,689 shares in his own name and disclaims beneficial ownership of the rest except to the extent of his pecuniary interest.

The document

Form 4, RCL, Arne Alexander Wilhelmsen, txns 6/9/10 Nov 2026, accepted 10 Nov 17:25 ET — holdings after: 15,709,236 indirect (11,673,977 Awilhelmsen AS + 4,035,259 Asset Management AS).
Form 4, txns 4–5 Nov 2026 — holdings after: 16,185,910 indirect (12,150,651 + 4,035,259).
Form 4, txns 25/26/27 Feb 2026, accepted 27 Feb 17:01 ET — 771,607 shares sold at weighted $310.78–$320.04; holdings after: 16,435,910 indirect (12,400,651 + 4,035,259).
Form 144 (Awilhelmsen AS), 4 Nov 16:07 ET — 500,000 shares, indicated $333.00.
Form 144 (Awilhelmsen AS), 9 Nov 16:04 ET — 500,000 shares, indicated $341.00.

Consensus read

A founding family is cashing out near the top. RCL is within 4% of its $356.39 52-week high and up roughly 30% in six months; the stock screens expensive on most fair-value models. The people who have owned the company since 1968 are taking a quarter of a billion dollars off the table while the cruise cycle is still good, and the two $500,000-share Form 144s say they are not finished. If anyone knows when cruise demand peaks, it is this family.

Contrarian read

This is the second of the family's two annual liquidity bursts, and it is less urgent than the first. In February they sold 771,607 shares in three sessions. In November they sold 716,674 in five — fewer shares, spread over more days, at a higher price. The burst structure is how this holding company has always funded itself; what changed in November is the calendar, not the view. A family top-ticking a cycle accelerates into strength. This one decelerated.

The evidence that discriminates

Shares per session. February: 771,607 over 3 sessions = 257,202/day, at weighted prices of $310.78–$320.04. November: 716,674 over 5 sessions = 143,335/day, at $319.20–$342.27. The daily rate fell 44% while the price rose 6–7%.

That number separates the two readings and nothing else in the filings does. Total dollars sold is consistent with both stories — it is the kind of fact that feels like evidence and is not. Price level is consistent with both. But urgency has a signature: a seller who believes the price is about to break raises the rate as the price rises, because every day of delay costs money. Awilhelmsen cut the rate almost in half at a better price. Inference The filings do not state intent; the per-session rate is the only observable that behaves differently under the two hypotheses.

Second discriminator, weaker but real: the entity split. Only Awilhelmsen AS sells. Asset Management AS has sat at exactly 4,035,259 shares across every filing from February to November. A family derisking a cycle would reduce both sleeves. One sleeve is a treasury function; two would be a view.

What would falsify me

A third Form 144 before 31 December, or executions that take the November burst past February's 771,607 shares or past roughly 257,000 shares per session. Either would show the rate reaccelerating into strength and would kill the "calendar, not conviction" reading outright. A 13D/A disclosing an intent to reduce below the family's board-representation threshold would do the same faster.

Pattern vs their own history

Awilhelmsen AS balance: 12,400,651 (27 Feb) → 12,150,651 (5 Nov) → 11,673,977 (10 Nov). The full-year decline is 726,674 shares; 716,674 of them — 98.6% — happened in the last five trading days. The eight months between the two Form 4s account for roughly 10,000 shares. Two Form 144s totalling 1,000,000 shares have been noticed against 716,674 executed, so up to ~283,000 shares may still print under the existing notices.

Confirmed · transaction Security type: arithmetic inference Form 4

The week's biggest "insider buy" bought none of the stock — Seglem paid $20.88 for a unit trading at $8.75

Trygve Seglem · director, KNOT Offshore Partners LP · 70% owner of Seglem Holding AS, ultimate co-owner of the partnership's general partner
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What they did

On 3 November 2026, acquired 2,083,333 units at $20.88 — $43,499,993 — taking the reported post-transaction balance to 3,541,666. Every insider-buying screener ran it as the largest purchase of the week; Benzinga headlined it "Eye On Growth."

On the same day, KNOP common units traded at $8.75.

The document

Form 4, KNOP, Seglem Trygve (director), txn 3 Nov 2026, accepted 4 Nov 16:15 ET — 2,083,333 units, code P, $20.88, holdings after 3,541,666.
Prior Form 4, txn 15 Jun 2026, accepted 16 Jun 2026 — 1,250,000 Series A Preferred Units, code P, $20.00 ($25.0m), indirect, "By Knutsen NYK Offshore Tankers AS"; preferred balance 208,333 → 1,458,333. Same filing reports 9,661,255 common units held through the same entity, plus 90,368 through KNOT Offshore Partners GP LLC and 252,405 Class B.
Footnote chain: Knutsen NYK Offshore Tankers AS owns 100% of the general partner; it is a 50/50 JV between NYK Holding (Europe) B.V. and TS Shipping Invest AS; TSSI is wholly owned by Seglem Holding AS, 70% owned by Seglem with the balance held by his immediate family.

Consensus read

The man who controls the sponsor put $43.5m of his own money into a shipping partnership trading at a fraction of NAV. Insider buying is the cleanest signal in the data because there is only one reason to buy. He already bought $25m in June; this doubles down. Screeners rank it first, and they rank it first for a good reason — nobody writes a $43.5m cheque for a company they expect to disappoint.

Contrarian read

He did not buy KNOP. He financed it. These are Series A Preferred Units — the instrument that sits ahead of the common in the capital structure — bought through the entity that owns the general partner. The sponsor is supplying capital the public market will not supply at an acceptable price, and it is taking the senior security to do it. For a holder of the common, a sponsor who repeatedly chooses preferred over common is a warning, not a vote of confidence.

The evidence that discriminates

1 · The price gap settles the instrument question. He paid $20.88 on a day the common traded at $8.75 — 2.39×. There is no circumstance in which an insider pays 2.39× the market price for the same economics. The price alone proves a different security.

2 · The arithmetic proves which security. June's preferred balance was 1,458,333. Add November's 2,083,333 and you get 3,541,666 — the exact reported post-transaction balance. The balance therefore belongs to the Series A Preferred line, not the common line. Inference This is arithmetic from two filings, not a quoted field; I could not reach the primary document to read the security description directly.

3 · The number that is not there. The 9,661,255 common units held through the same entity are unchanged. He bought zero common. At $8.75 the same $43.5m would have bought roughly 4.97 million common units. He had the cash, the entity, the information and the opportunity, and he bought none. That is the fact that discriminates hardest, because it is the one a genuine confidence-buy cannot produce.

Note what is not evidence here: the dollar size, the "P" transaction code, and the 142.86% position increase the screeners report. All three are equally consistent with both readings. The P code covers negotiated and open-market purchases alike.

What would falsify me

A Form 4 or 13D/A showing Knutsen NYK Offshore Tankers AS or Seglem Holding buying KNOP common units in the open market. That single transaction would overturn the whole reading. Second falsifier: KNOP disclosing that the Series A proceeds funded an accretive vessel dropdown at a stated return, rather than refinancing, distribution support or working capital — that would make the preferred a growth instrument rather than a plug.

Pattern vs their own history

Series A Preferred held through Knutsen NYK: 208,333 before June → 1,458,333 (15 Jun, $25.0m at $20.00) → 3,541,666 (3 Nov, $43.5m at $20.88). That is 17× in under five months, and $68.5m of sponsor capital across two tranches. The second tranche is 74% larger than the first and priced 4.4% higher. Over the same period the common-unit line did not change once.

Confirmed · holdings chain reconciles Motive: not knowable from the filings

Charles Schwab sold $6.6m on Monday and gave away $3.0m on Tuesday — and the filings cannot tell you why

Charles R. Schwab · founder and co-chairman, The Charles Schwab Corporation · age 89
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What they did
DateCodeSharesPriceBalance after
3 Nov 2026S — sale11,675$89.2153,334,616
9 Nov 2026S — sale70,750wtd $93.0074 ($92.835–$93.135)53,263,866
10 Nov 2026G — bona fide gift31,850$053,232,016

All on the trust line. Other reported indirect holdings: 30,021,463 by a limited partnership, 10,624,797 by his spouse as trustee, 44,025 by 188 Corp.

The document

Form 4, SCHW, Schwab Charles R. (co-chairman, director), txns 9–10 Nov 2026, accepted 10 Nov 20:09 ET, signature dated 10 Nov. Preceding Form 4, txn 3 Nov 2026. The three balances chain exactly: 53,334,616 − 70,750 = 53,263,866; 53,263,866 − 31,850 = 53,232,016. That reconciliation is why this item is marked confirmed despite running through two filings and two aggregators.

Consensus read

An 89-year-old founder trims a sliver and makes a charitable gift. Total movement is 0.19% of the trust line over seven sessions, against a stake worth roughly $4.95bn on that line alone. There is nothing to read here, and the financial press will — correctly — not write about it at all.

Contrarian read

The sale is noise; the sequence is the item. He sold 6.1× more shares on 9 November than on 3 November, at a 4.3% higher price, and gifted the next day. That ordering — raise cash, then transfer appreciated stock — is the signature of a dated transfer plan running to a year-end, not of a man reacting to a share price. The useful question is not whether he is selling. It is which transfer calendar he is on.

The evidence that discriminates — and where it runs out

What the documents say: three dated transactions, two codes, exact balances. What they do not say: the gift recipient, whether a Rule 10b5-1 plan exists, and whether the sale and the gift are connected at all. Inference The one-day gap is suggestive; it is not proof of a link.

The honest position is that the motive is not knowable from this evidence. Three hypotheses are live, and each has a different observable consequence:

  • (a) Year-end charitable transfer. Appreciated stock to a donor-advised fund or charity before 31 December; the sale funds something unrelated. Distinguishing test: further G codes in December, and a Form 5 in February covering small gifts not reported in real time.
  • (b) Estate-planning transfer. Shares moved to a family trust or GRAT, with the sale covering the tax or the annuity. Distinguishing test: a new indirect holder line appearing on the next Form 4 — the trust line splitting is the tell.
  • (c) Routine diversification plus unrelated giving. No link at all. Distinguishing test: S-code sales continuing at a similar cadence through Q1 with no further G codes.

I am not going to pick one. Nothing in the window separates them, and the size ratio — 0.13% of the trust line sold — rules out any reading in which this expresses a view on Schwab stock. That is the only firm conclusion available.

What would falsify me

The claim being made is narrow: that this is calendar-driven and carries no view on the stock. It is wrong if December brings a sale an order of magnitude larger — say above 700,000 shares, 10× the 9 November print — or if a Form 144 appears proposing a seven-figure share count. Either would mean November was the leading edge of a real reduction rather than plumbing.

Pattern vs their own history

Within the window: 11,675 shares (3 Nov) → 70,750 (9 Nov) = 6.1× at a 4.3% higher price. Net position change across the seven sessions: 53,334,616 → 53,232,016, down 0.19%. For scale, the 9 November sale raised about $6.58m against a trust-line stake worth roughly $4.95bn.

§ 2

Where Consensus Is Right

Two items I tried to overturn this edition and could not. Both are reported here as consensus wins.

Keith Meister is exiting Illumina, and the ordinary reading of it survives

Sold 281,433 shares on 3–4 November at $225.12–$241.42 ($66.56m), leaving 488,917 indirect and 6,887 direct. On 10 November Corvex Management LP filed a Form 144 for 375,000 more at an indicated $220.78 — $82.79m, about 76% of what remains, at a price 8.5% below the top of the range he just sold into.

What I tested. The attractive contrarian story is that this is fund-level housekeeping rather than a thesis change: redemptions, position-size discipline, or loss harvesting into year-end. It would make a better item than the obvious one.

Why it did not survive. Every contrarian read in this edition rests on a specific mechanical artifact — a collapsing per-session sale rate, a 2.39× price gap that proves a different instrument, a sale-then-gift sequence. Here there is no artifact to find. No option exercise. No withholding. No trust transfer. No share-class conversion. No entity reshuffle. Just a sitting director selling common stock on the open market, then noticing a larger sale at a lower price. The discriminating evidence that would separate the readings — Corvex's other positions, which would show whether this is one name or the whole book — does not exist yet; the Q3 13F is not due until mid-November. Under this edition's own rule, a contrarian claim with no discriminating evidence gets cut.

Verdict

The consensus read — an activist with a board seat is reducing into weakness and has noticed most of the remainder — is the one the evidence supports. The only thing worth adding is a date: the 13F lands in the next few days and will settle whether this is Illumina-specific or portfolio-wide. Until then, take the plain reading.

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Alexandra and Julian Burt gave away A$120m, and there is no second story under it

Announced 10 November 2026: a combined A$120m to ten conservation organisations. Australian Wildlife Conservancy A$25m; Bush Heritage Australia A$25m; eight recipients unnamed. Bush Heritage has said A$6m of its share goes toward acquiring the 20,000-hectare Wooroora station near Cairns. Alexandra Burt is a granddaughter of Peter Wright, Lang Hancock's business partner; Forbes estimates her and her sister Leonie Baldock at a combined US$4.2bn. Single-source

What I tested. Whether the structure is the story — specifically, whether this is a perpetual family vehicle (an ancillary fund with a mandated minimum distribution and the family's name on it) presented as a gift, which is the more common shape for a sum this size from an Australian mining fortune.

Why it did not survive. The reporting describes ten direct grants to operating charities, with at least one earmarked to a named land purchase. Grants tied to a specific acquisition are made directly; endowment-style giving is not. The article does not state the structure at all, so the contrarian claim would have rested on an absence — and an absence in a single news report is not evidence of anything. No vehicle has been named because none has been reported, not because one is being concealed.

Verdict

They appear to have given the money away. The one thing genuinely unreported is whether the funds are personal or come through Wright Prospecting interests, and that distinction matters for nothing an outside reader would do differently.

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§ 3

What Repeats

The mechanic showing up in more than one person's filings this week.

The Form 144 is the lead indicator. The Form 4 is the receipt — and the gap between their prices is the only urgency measure the filings give you.

A Form 144 is filed when the order is placed, with a price indicated at that moment. The Form 4 reports what actually executed, up to two business days later. Where a seller files the 144 genuinely in advance, the spread between the two prices measures what they were willing to give up to get out.

Three of this week's largest disposals were visible as 144s before any Form 4 existed: Awilhelmsen AS (500,000 noticed 4 Nov at $333.00; 500,000 noticed 9 Nov at $341.00), Corvex Management (375,000 noticed 10 Nov at $220.78, still unexecuted), and Shyam Sankar at Palantir (300,000 noticed 10 Nov at $169.20, about $50.76m). Sankar: single-source

But most 144s this week carried zero information, because they were filed the same day at the executed price — a formality rather than a notice. Stephen Squeri at American Express, Gregory Brown at Motorola Solutions, Matthew White at Linde and Trina Spear at FIGS all show a 0.0% spread. Awilhelmsen's two show −1.1% and −0.7%.

One seller stands apart. Ronda Stryker filed a 144 on 5 November indicating $339.65 and executed on 6 November at $325.32 — a −4.2% spread, by an order of magnitude the widest in the week's large prints. She filed a day ahead, the stock moved against her, and she sold anyway.

That is either a plan executing mechanically, or a seller who did not care about 4%. It is worth noting that this is the same filing whose Rule 10b5-1 checkbox was reported as unmarked in yesterday's edition — a detail that rested on one automated summary. The two facts sit badly together: price-insensitivity is what a plan looks like, and a missing checkbox is what discretion looks like. One of the two readings is wrong, and the primary document on EDGAR is the only thing that settles it.

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§ 4

Transferable To You

Ontario, private company, one individual. Honest verdicts — most of this does not scale down, and saying so is the useful part.

Transfers · act this week

Schwab's gift of appreciated stock → donating listed securities in kind

Schwab gifted 31,850 shares rather than selling them and donating cash. In Canada the equivalent choice is not a nuance, it is the whole decision: a gift of publicly listed securities made in kind to a registered charity has the taxable capital gain reduced to nil under s.38(a.1) of the Income Tax Act, and the donation receipt is still for full fair market value. Sell first and donate the proceeds, and you pay tax on the gain and get the same receipt. Same charity, same dollars, materially different outcome.

This is one of the rare mechanics on this page that works identically at $3m and at $3,000. It needs no structure, no scale and no US domicile — only a non-registered account holding something with an unrealised gain.

The limit worth knowing: this treatment is for publicly listed securities. Shares of a private Canadian corporation — your own company's shares — are governed by different rules and generally do not get it. Do not assume the two are the same.

First step this weekBefore committing to any 2026 year-end giving, pull the unrealised gain on every non-registered holding and ask your accountant whether an in-kind transfer to the charity is available for the ones showing large gains. The transfer takes days to settle, so the deadline is effectively mid-December, not 31 December.
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Transfers in principle · needs professional execution

Seglem's preferred injection → the Ontario estate freeze

Strip away the shipping partnership and Seglem's move is a general principle: when an owner puts new money into a company he controls, the class of security decides who gets the next dollar of growth. He took preferred — fixed claim, senior position, no participation in the upside. That is a deliberate choice about where future value accrues.

The Canadian freeze runs the same logic in reverse and is the single most common structure for a founder in your position. You exchange your common shares for fixed-value preferred shares equal to today's valuation, and new common — typically held by a family trust — takes all future growth. Your eventual tax bill is capped at today's number; the growth is taxed in other hands later.

The reason this is a "partially" and not a "yes": a freeze is priced off a defensible fair market valuation, and it drags in s.86 or s.51 rollover mechanics, the s.74.4 corporate attribution rules, TOSI, and the trust's 21-year deemed disposition. None of that is a DIY exercise, and a freeze done at a number you cannot defend is worse than no freeze.

First step this weekGet a current, defensible valuation of the company — not a founder's estimate. The missing valuation is what delays nearly every freeze, and it is the one piece you can start now without committing to anything. A freeze done before a growth inflection is worth far more than one done after.
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Partially transfers · the Canadian version has a different job

Awilhelmsen AS → the Ontario holdco

The Norwegian family holds its wealth in a company and sells from it in bursts. A holdco above an operating company is ordinary in Ontario too — but it works for them because the underlying asset is a liquid listed stock they can turn into cash at will. Yours is not.

For a private Ontario software company the holdco's jobs are different: creditor protection (moving retained earnings out of the operating company's risk), tax-deferred intercorporate dividends, and preserving the lifetime capital gains exemption on qualified small business corporation shares. That last one has a live trap worth knowing about: the QSBC tests require most of the company's assets to be used in an active business, and excess cash or passive investments sitting inside the opco can fail them — which can cost you the exemption on a future sale. "Purification" is the usual remedy and it takes planning time, not a year-end decision.

First step this weekAsk your accountant one specific question: does the operating company currently pass the QSBC active-asset tests, and if not, what has to move and how long does it take? Ask it now rather than when a buyer appears.
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Does not transfer

Burst liquidity, and the Form 144 lead-time edge

Selling in two scheduled bursts a year needs a liquid public stock and a reason to care about market windows. You have neither. The nearest private-company analogue — how and when you take money out — is a salary-versus-dividend decision driven by your personal marginal rate and the corporation's tax attributes, and its cadence is set by the tax year, not by the market. Borrowing the shape of Awilhelmsen's calendar would be cargo-culting.

The 144-before-the-4 edge has no Canadian private-company equivalent at all. It is included in §3 only because it is this week's cleanest demonstration of a general habit worth keeping: in any disclosure regime, find out which document is filed when the decision is made rather than when the transaction completes. That one is almost always where the information is, and it is almost always the one nobody reads.

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This page is information, not financial, tax or legal advice. I am not a licensed advisor. Every structural or tax item above — the in-kind donation treatment, the estate freeze, the QSBC and LCGE tests — should be confirmed with a licensed accountant and, where a structure is involved, a tax lawyer, against the rules in force at the time and against your own circumstances. Dollar thresholds, inclusion rates and exemption limits change; none are quoted here for that reason.

§ 5

Sources

01
Finviz — Top insider trading, recent week (Form 4 and Form 144 rows) · accessed 11 Nov 2026
02
Investing.com — Royal Caribbean director Arne Wilhelmsen sells $159.8M in stock (txns 6/9/10 Nov; holdings by entity) · 10 Nov 2026
03
Investing.com — Royal Caribbean director Arne Wilhelmsen sells $82.1M in stock (txns 4–5 Nov; 240,000 shares; balance 12,150,651) · 5 Nov 2026
04
StockTitan — RCL Form 4, Awilhelmsen AS sells 771,607 shares (txns 25–27 Feb 2026; balance 12,400,651) · filed 27 Feb 2026
05
MarketBeat — RCL director Wilhelmsen sells 168,530 shares (10 Nov line) · 10 Nov 2026
06
StockTitan — KNOP Form 4, Seglem Trygve, 1,250,000 Series A Preferred Units at $20.00 via Knutsen NYK Offshore Tankers AS; full footnote ownership chain · txn 15 Jun 2026
07
MarketBeat — KNOP director purchases 2,083,333 units at $20.88 (balance 3,541,666; common quoted at $8.75) · 4 Nov 2026
08
Benzinga — "Eye On Growth: Trygve Seglem Adds $43.50M Of KNOT Offshore Partners Stock To Portfolio" (the consensus framing) · Nov 2026
09
StockTitan — SCHW Form 4, Charles R. Schwab: 70,750-share trust sale 9 Nov at wtd $93.0074, 31,850-share gift 10 Nov; balances 53,263,866 and 53,232,016 · accepted 10 Nov 2026 20:09 ET
10
agent402 — SCHW insider report: Schwab Charles R., 3 Nov 2026 sale of 11,675 at $89.21, balance 53,334,616 · accessed 11 Nov 2026
11
rallies.ai — Illumina director Keith Meister, 281,433 shares over 3–4 Nov at $225.12–$241.42, $66.56m; holdings 488,917 indirect / 6,887 direct · 5 Nov 2026
12
ABC News — Perth billionaires Alexandra and Julian Burt donate $120 million to 10 conservation groups · 10 Nov 2026
13
InsiderTrades — Ronda E. Stryker transaction history (6 Nov 2026 sale at $325.32; full 2023–2026 cadence) · accessed 11 Nov 2026
14
StockTitan — SYK Form 4, Ronda E. Stryker, 310,000 shares by Revocable Trust (txn 26 May 2026); L. Lee Stryker Trust holding 12,177,521 · filed 28 May 2026
15
Finwire — Stryker Corp director Ronda E. Stryker sells $179m of stock (reports the Rule 10b5-1 box as unmarked) · 9 Nov 2026
16
Investing.com — FIGS CEO Catherine Spear sells $79.7m, 9 Nov (option exercise, withholding and net-share detail cited in §3) · 9 Nov 2026